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ABSTRACT 
To date the New Zealand courts have not had to decide whether the wishes of 
a competent child, who refuses medical treatment, should be overridden. The broad 
objective of this research paper is to examine this area of legal uncertainty. This 
paper will provide a critical analysis of the leading English case law in this area. 
There are two leading English cases. The first is the case of Gillick v West Norfolk 
and Wisbech Area Health Authorit/ which concerned the issue of whether 
contraceptive advice and treatment could be given to girls under the age of 16 
without the knowledge and consent of their parents. The House of Lords held that 
some children are legally competent to consent to some medical treatment, namely 
children who fully understand the significance of such decisions. This case 
established what is called the 'Gillick competency' test. Whether a child is Gillick 
competent is a question of fact. It is not enough that the child should understand the 
nature of the advice given, the child must also have sufficient maturity to understand 
what is involved in the treatment. 2 This paper argues that if the situation arises the 
Gillick test should be applied in New Zealand. 
The second English case of Re R3 concerned a child who suffered from a 
psychiatric condition and who refused to take anti-psychotic medication. The Court 
of Appeal held that the powers of a wardship judge include the power to consent to 
medical treatment when the ward has not been asked or has declined medical 
treatment.4 Further the Court held that a parent of a Gillick competent child could 
override the child's refusal to consent to treatment. In essence Re R held a competent 
child in England can consent to medical treatment but cannot refuse medical 
treatment. 
This research paper intends to challenge the decision of Re R. It is asserted 
that if a child is found to be Gillick competent then there should be no difference in 
his or her ability to consent to having treatment as opposed to his or her ability to 
1 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985) 3 All ER 402 (HL) [Gillick]. 
2 Gillick, above, 423 Lord Scarman. 
3 Re R (1992) Fam 11 (CA). 
4 Re R, above, 23. 
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refuse it. Having argued that the Gillick test should be applied in New Zealand, this 
paper will then address the legal uncertainty that is involved in the area of medical 
treatment and religion. It is submitted that children should not automatically be 
classed as incompetent on the basis of religion. If an adult is classed as competent 
and can refuse medical treatment on the basis of religion then a competent child 
should be treated in the same way. 
This paper will then go on to discuss, a further contentious issue regarding 
the rights of parents in relation to medical treatment of their children. Do parents 
have an absolute right to be informed of all advice or medical treatment their 
children seek? Should parents be able to override his or her child's consent to 
medical treatment? This paper will also review the rights of parents to refuse to 
consent to medical treatment of their children on the basis of religion. 
The text of this paper including footnotes (excluding title page, table of contents and 
bibliography) comprises approximately of 15, 093 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Tovia Laufau was 13 years of age when he died on 7 September 1999. He 
had a tumour the size of a football on his right knee. Tovia begged his family to 
discontinue medical treatment. As a result of the public outrage in the recent 
Williams-Holloway case the hospital did not apply to the court for a wardship order. 
This situation raises the issue of whether the court would have overridden Tovia's 
wishes.5 The law in New Zealand is uncertain when a child is competent and refuses 
medical treatment. The question that needs to be asked is whether children should 
have the right to refuse to consent to treatment? 
There is an ongoing debate as to how much the State should intervene 
between the relationship between parents and children. Many argue that the State 
should have greater power over the way in which our children are brought up, 
including the treatment and decisions that they can make. Others argue that the State 
should have little control over the parental decisions concerning their children and 
that parental autonomy should prevail.6 Some people believe that the law should 
spell out the rights of the children, in a bill similar to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBOR Act). 7 
This paper asserts that a Gillick8 competent child should have the right to 
refuse medical treatment and that their wishes should be upheld under section 11 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 11 provides that " [e]veryone has 
the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment." The High Court has held that 
"everyone" means everyone who is competent.9 This means that a Gillick competent 
child should have the right to refuse medical treatment. Further this paper asserts that 
the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers Rights , and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child support the right of competent 
children to refuse medical treatment. It is further asserted that the New Zealand 
5 In March 2000, Tovia ' s parents were charged with manslaughter and with fa iling to provide the 
necessities of I ife under ssl 71 and 151 of the Crimes Act 1961. They were found guilty under s 151. 
6 WR Atkin , "Parents and Children Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" (1986) NZLJ 90. 
7 Atkin , above 90. 
8 The Gillick competency test deri ved from the case of Gillick v West No,folk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority [1985) 3 ALL ER 402 (HL) [Gillick]. 
9 Re S [1992) l NZLR 363 , 374 (HC) Baker J. 
courts should follow the Gillick test and reject the subsequent test in Re R. 
10 It is 
submitted that the Re R decision has unduly restricted the Gillick test and undermines 
the autonomy and human rights of a competent child. 
It is also asserted that if a competent adult can refuse medical treatment on 
the basis of religion then a child should also be able to do so. Religion alone should 
not class a child incompetent. In some overseas cases involving religious rights of 
the child, the courts have held the child to be incompetent because the courts see the 
child ' s wishes as the wishes of the parents.11 In other words the child has been 
unduly influenced, and therefore he or she is incompetent to make a decision to 
refuse medical treatment. This paper asserts that a child's religious beliefs in relation 
to medical treatment should be distinguished from situations such as psychiatric 
conditions where it is obvious that the child is incompetent. 
The New Zealand courts under its wardship jurisdiction, have the power to 
authorise or withhold permission for medical treatment for a child. This power to 
authorise or withhold medical treatment can override the wishes of parents. This 
paper expresses the view that the courts have a duty to protect the child particularly 
in cases involving life-threatening conditions. It must be remembered that the rights 
belong to the child and until the child is competent to make the decision to refuse 
treatment for him or herself the courts should do everything possible to sustain that 
child ' s life. 
II GILLICK COMPETENCE 
A Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbeclz Area Health Authority12 
The Gillick decision can be described as a landmark decision in which the 
majority of the House of Lords outlined the law in relation to parental rights. The 
case came about after the Department of Health and Social Security circulated a 
10 Re R [1992] Fam 11 (CA). 
11 Re L [1998] 2 FLR 591 (HC); Re CL [1994] NZFLR 352 (HC); Prince v Massachusetts 321 U.S. 
158, 88 L.Ed. 645 , 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944). 
12 Gillick, above. 
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memorandum to area health authorities which advised that it would not be unlawful 
to give out contraceptive advice and treatment to girls under the age of 16 years 
without parental consent. 
Mrs Gillick, who had five daughters, under the age of 16 years objected. Mrs 
Gillick was a staunch Roman Catholic and rejected any artificial contraception. She 
wanted the right to determine how her daughters would be brought up without the 
interference from the state. Mrs Gillick wanted an assurance that while her daughters 
were still under 16 years, none of them would be able to obtain contraceptive advice 
or the contraceptive pill without her consent. When the local authority refused to 
provide this assurance she commenced legal proceedings seeking: 
(1) That the memorandum was unlawful, because it was contrary to 
section 28(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, which provides that it 
is an offence for a person to encourage the commission of unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 for whom he or she is 
responsible for. 
(2) That it was unlawful to give advice and / or treatment to children 
under 16 without parental consent because it was inconsistent with 
parental rights. 
The Comt at first instance held that a doctor giving contraceptive advice and 
treatment to a child under 16 years was not a breach of section 28(1) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956, so long as the advice was given in accordance with the 
information contained in the memorandum. In relation to the second issue the Judge 
held that a parent's interest in his or her child is not a "right". Parents have a duty or 
responsibility and on that basis contraceptive advice to a girl under the age of 16 
without parental consent was not unlawful. 
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Mrs Gillick then appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 
overturned the Judge's decision on the basis that a child under 16 could not consent 
to treatment without parental consent and therefore the memorandum was unlawful. 
The Department appealed to the House of Lords. It was in this Court that Mrs Gillick 
lost her battle by a three to two majority. 
The Gillick decision not only decided the issue of whether the medical 
profession could legally give out contraceptive advice without parental consent, but 
also had a number of other implications. Firstly, the decision addressed the issue of 
contraceptive advice given to minors. This addressed a number of questions such as: 
whether parents have an overriding right to know whether their daughter has sought 
contraceptive assistance? Was the medical professional required to consult parents or 
was the consent of a minor enough to enable the treatment to proceed? Secondly, the 
decision addressed the broader issue of whether parental consent is necessary for all 
medical procedures not just contraceptive advice. Is it necessary for the medical 
profession to seek parental consent for all medical treatment (not including medical 
emergencies)? Thirdly, the House of Lords reviewed parental rights generally in 
relation to children. How far does the law extend parental autonomy and can a child 
act independently? The majority looked at the broader principles concerning parental 
rights. The minority focused their judgment on the contraceptive advice only. 
B The Gillick Test 
The House of Lords held that children might be legally competent to consent 
to some medical treatment, such children being those who fully understand the 
significance of such decisions. In order to determine whether a child is Gillick 
competent Lord Scarman stated: 13 
I would hold as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not a 
minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminated if and 
when the child reaches sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him 
or her to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a question of fact whether 
a child seeking advice has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give 
consent valid in law .. .It is not enough that she should understand the nature of 
the advice given: she must also have a sufficient maturity to understand what is 
involved. 
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Having found that a child under the age of 16 can consent to medical 
treatment, the question arose when does parental consent cease? Can a parent 
oveITide the wishes of a competent chi Id under the age of 16? Lord Scarman held 
that parental power to consent to treatment is oveITidden if a child is Gillick 
competent. 14 Gillick competence reflects the staged development of a child, meaning 
the transition from childhood through adolescence to adulthood. It reflects the 
gradual acquisition of maturity and the capacity to consent may vary according to the 
gravity of the proposed treatment. This will be a question of fact.
15 For example a 
child might have the capacity to consent to surgical treatment for a broken arm but 
may not have the capacity to consent to more serious life threatening forms of 
treatment such as a blood transfusion. 
In reaching this opinion his Lordship refeITed to the Canadian High Court 
case of Johnston v Wellesley Hospital
16 which held: 
But, regardless of modern trend , I can find nothing in any of the old 
reported cases, except where infants of tender age or young children were 
involved, where the Courts have found that a person under 21 years of 
age was legally incapable of consenting to medical treatment. If a person 
were unable to consent to medical treatment, he would also be incapable 
of consenting to other types of bodily interference. A proposition 
purporting to establish that any bodily inte1ference acquiesced in by a 
youth of 20 years would nevertheless constitute an assault would be 
absurd. If such were the case, sexual intercourse with a girl under 21 
years would constitute rape. Until the minimum age of consent to sexual 
acts was fixed at 14 years by a statute, the Courts often held that infants 
were capable of consenting at a considerably earlier age than 14 years. I 
feel that the law on this point is well expressed in the volume on Medical 
Negligence (1957) by Lord Nathan (pl 76): "It is suggested that the most 
satisfactory solution of the problem is to rule that an infant who is capable 
of appreciating fully the nature and consequences of a particular 
operation or of particular treatment can give effective consent thereto, and 
in such cases the consent of the guardian is unnecessary; but that where 
the infant is without the capacity, any apparent consent by him or her will 
be a nullity, the sole right to consent being vested in the guardian." 
Lord Fraser stated: 
17 
13 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402,423 (HL) . 
14 Gillick, above, 423 . 
15 Gillick, above, 423. 
16 Johnston v Wellesley Hospital (1970) 17 DLR (3d) 139, 144-145 . 
17 Gillick [19851 3 ALL ER 402,409. 
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It seems to me verging on the absurd to suggest that a girl or boy aged 15 
could not effectively consent, for example, to have a medical examination 
of some trivial injury to his body or even to have a broken arm set. Of 
course the consent of the parents should normally be asked, but they may 
not be immediately available. Provided the patient, whether a boy or a 
girl , is capable of understanding what is proposed, and of expressing his 
or her own wishes, I see no good reason for holding that he or she lacks 
the capacity to express them validly and effectively and to authorise the 
medical man to make the examination or give the treatment which he 
advises. After all, a minor under the age of 16 can, within certain limits, 
enter into a contract. He or she can also sue and be sued, and can give 
evidence on oath. Moreover, a girl under 16 can give sufficiently 
effective consent to sexual intercourse to lead to the legal result that the 
man involved does not commit the crime of rape. 
Accordingly Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser were not convinced that a girl 
under 16 lacks the capacity to consent to contraceptive advice or treatment on the 
basis of her age, so long as she has sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
understand what is involved. 18 The majority of the House of Lords allowed the 
appeal. 
However, the minority, Lord Brandon and Lord Templeman, disagreed with 
the majority but each held different views. Lord Brandon held that it was unlawful 
for a girl under 16 to obtain contraceptive advice and treatment whether or not the 
girl's parents knew of it or consented to it.
19 Lord Templeman, however, did say that 
a doctor in exceptional circumstances may be able to give contraceptive treatment to 
a child under 16 but would be bound to tell a parent.
20 His Lordship considered that 
exceptional circumstances could arise if the child was "unable to control her sexual 
appetite."21 Both Lord Brandon and Lord Templeman held that girls under 16 were 
not competent as Parliament had declared pursuant to section 6 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 that an unmarried girl was not competent to decide to practice 
sex.22 The minority having arrived at these conclusions did not go further to consider 
the wider issue of whether children under 16 were able to consent to other medical 
treatment in the absence of parental consent. 
18 Gillick, above, 409. 
19 Gillick, above, 431. 
20 Gillick, above, 435. 
21 Gillick (19851 3 ALL ER, 402,435 (HL). 
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C Analysis of Gillick 
The Gillick decision has political , social, medical and religious 
implications.23 The question that arises is how is this decision relevant to New 
Zealand? This paper asserts that all of the issues addressed in the Gillick decision are 
relevant to New Zealand. The decision represents the common Jaw on the rights of a 
child to consent to medical treatment, and outlines parental responsibilities. In this 
regard this decision has implications for New Zealanders and not only affects the 
legal profession but also the medical profession, except in cases where there is an 
express statutory provision governing the medical treatment of minors. 
So when does a child have the capacity to consent to medical treatment? This 
is not an easy question to answer. This paper agrees with Lord Fraser, who argued 
that it would be absurd to say that parents have complete control of their child until 
he or she attains 16 years and that when that child turns 16 he or she suddenly has 
full independence. His Lordship noted that parental control starts with the right to 
control and ends with little more than advice.
24 In fact as his Lordship pointed out 
most parents in today's society gradually relax control over their children as they get 
older. 25 Furthermore as society has changed over the years so too should the law. 
Indeed issues that arise in today ' s society have never been issues that our ancestors 
have had to face . Children today have far more independence. 
Children today make various decisions from an early age. A child at the age 
of 8 might be able to take an oath and at 15 a child might be able to consent to 
marriage or choose his or her guardian and be able to make his or her will.
26 To say 
that a child is not competent to refuse medical treatment is illogical if we are to say 
that he or she can be competent to consent to treatment. To place an age on a child 
which apparently classes him or her as competent is unjust. Children do not 
necessarily become competent upon reaching the age of 16. You could have two 15 
year-old children, one may be immature, while the other may clearly have the mental 
maturity and intelligence to understand the consequences of his or her decision. 
22 Gillick, above, 433 . 
23 W.R Atkin, "Parents and Children Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" (1986) NZLJ 90, 91. 
24 Gillick, above, 411. 
25 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402, 411 (HL). 
26 Gillick, above 421. 
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It is acknowledged that some critics may argue that there is a difference 
between the capacity to make a will and the capacity to make a decision involving a 
life threatening condition . However, if it is medically established that the child is 
competent to make the decision then his or her right to refuse treatment should be 
upheld. Its important to remember that the Gillick test does not apply to cases where 
the child is suffering from conditions such as anorexia nervosa
27 or from a psychiatric 
condition28 where the condition itself affects the child's ability to consent. 
Unti I the child is sufficient] y competent to consent to medical treatment, 
parental rights concerning consent to treatment remain undisturbed, except in cases 
where there is an emergency, parental neglect or abandonment. In such cases a 
doctor may proceed with treatment without parental consent.
29 However, as Lord 
Scarman pointed out, under the common law, while accepting that parental rights do 
not wholly disappear until the child reaches the age of majority, that right has never 
been treated as "sovereign or beyond review and control."
30 The parental rights 
derived from the parental duty and only existed so long as it was necessary for the 
protection of the person and property of the child.
31 As Lord Fraser pointed out 
" . . . parental rights to control the child existed not for the benefit of the parent but for 
the child. They exist for the benefit of the child and they are justified only in so far as 
they enable the parent to perform his duties towards the child, and towards other 
children in the family. "32 
Following the Gillick decision the law in England concerning the rights of 
competent children to consent to medical treatment was settled until the later 
decision of Re R. 33 
27 Re W (a 111i11or: 111edical trea t111ent) [1994] 4 ALL ER 627 (CA). 
28 Re R (a minor) [1991] 4 ALL ER 177 (CA). 
29 Gillick [1985) 3 ALL ER 402, 123-124 (HL). 
30 Gillick, above, 420. 
31 Gillick, above, 420. 
32 Gillick, above, 410. 
33 Re R (a minor) [1991] 4 ALL ER 177 (CA). 
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III RE R 34 
A Background 
The case of Re R concerned a child who suffered from a psychiatric condition 
and who refused to take her anti-psychotic medication. R was almost 16 years old. 
She was well known to social services and was on the local register for at-risk 
children. It was considered that R had been the victim of emotional abuse at home. In 
1991 R was placed into voluntary care after a fight with her father. While in care she 
did not want to see her father and became increasingly anxious . R's demeanor was 
reported as flat and expressionless. She was also experiencing visual and auditory 
hallucinations and at times was suicidal. R eventually became a ward of the court. 
In June 1991 a social worker was contacted by a senior consultant who 
requested permission to administer anti-psychotic medication. The consultant 
believed R was in a psychotic state. Social services consented to the treatment. On 
the same day R contacted social services and said she refused to consent to the 
medication. After a lengthy conversation social services concluded that R sounded 
lucid and rational. She was not regarded as sectionable under the Mental Health Act 
1983. However, the unit remained of the medical opinion that R needed inpatient 
treatment, as she admitted that she was sti]] suffering from mood swings, suicidal 
thoughts, and some visual and auditory hallucinations. 
B Issues before the Court 
The first issue before the Court was: 
(i) Can the court override a competent child's refusal to consent to 
medical treatment? 
The Court concluded that under its wardship juiisdiction it could override a child' s 
refusal. Staughton lJ stated " ... the powers of a wardship judge do indeed include 
power to consent to medical treatment when the ward has not been asked or has 
declined."35 Lord Donaldson stated: 36 
34 Re R [1992] Fam 11 (CA). 
35 Re R, above, 23. 
It is, however, clear that the practical jurisdiction of the court is wider 
than that of parents. The court can, for example, forbid the publication of 
information about the ward or the ward's family circumstances. It is clear 
that this jurisdiction is not derivative from the parents' rights and 
responsibilities, but derives from, or is, the delegated performance of the 
duties of the Crown to protect its subjects and particularly children who 
are the generations of the future. 
His Lordship went on to say that he could see no reason why the court m its 
jurisdiction could not override the Gillick competent child.
37 
The second issue for the Court was: 
(ii) Can parental consent to treatment override the wishes of the child? 
The Court split this question into two parts. In referring to the decision of Gillick the 
Court distinguished the Gillick case by saying that the House of Lords in Gillick was 
only dealing with the issue of whether children could consent to treatment and not 
the issue of whether children could refuse to consent to medical treatment. 
Lord Donaldson MR held that a doctor could lawfully administer treatment to 
a competent child who refuses, if the parents have given consent.
38 Conversely 
however, the parents could not override the wishes of a child consenting to treatment. 
In effect the Court held a Gillick competent child can consent to treatment but cannot 
refuse consent to treatment. Both a court and a parent could therefore override a 
child's refusal. 
It is submitted that if a Gillick competent child has the right to consent to 
medical treatment, then once the child reached this stage the parents' right to consent 
or refuse to consent to medical treatment ceases. 
C Analysis of Re R 
Re R contradicts Lord Scarman, m the Gillick decision, who held that the 
legally mature minor's 1ights superseded parental power to approve or decline 
36 Re R, above, 22. 
37 Re R, above, 22. 
38 Re R [1992] Fam 11, 24 (CA). 
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medical treatment. Although the Gillick case concerned the issue of whether a child 
under 16 could consent to contraceptive advice, the majority approached the case 
from a wider perspective and looked at the whole issue of consent. It is submitted 
that their Lordships did not make a distinction between the capacity to consent to 
medical treatment and the capacity to refuse medical treatment. The Court in Re R 
decided that while the Gillick competent child's decision to consent to medical 
treatment could not be usurped by the parents, a refusal to undergo medical treatment 
could. 
Lord Donaldson MR distinguished Gillick on the ground that it only 
concerned a child's independent right to consent. This right of the child did not 
override a parent's right to consent on behalf of his or her child. Lord Donaldson's 
MR rationale was that unless an independent right to consent from a parent was 
recognised, doctors would be faced with an "intolerable dilemma."
39 With all due 
respect it is asserted that by avoiding an apparent "intolerable dilemma" a minor's 
self-autonomy is subordinate to legal certainty. This reasoning is also in conflict with 
the Gillick decision where the House of Lords suggested that certainty was not a 
significant factor for the majority of the judges.
40 
It is asserted that the New Zealand courts should not follow this reasoning on 
the basis of a possible "intolerable dilemma." The Gillick test confronts doctors with 
a difficult situation and raises difficult questions about a child's developmental 
capacity. However, it is submitted that any situation that involves assessing a 
person's mental capacity whether that person is a minor, elderly, or mentally 
incapacitated can create a dilemma for the doctor. Under the Gillick test before a 
doctor can act on a child's consent, he or she must assess the child's capacity. 
Assessing whether a child is Gillick competent would be no more difficult in cases 
where the child consents than in cases where the child refuses. Surely this is a better 
approach than to ignore the issue altogether and to render the minor's refusal invalid. 
The same argument can be put forward from the child s perspective. When a 
child is weighing up whether to consent to medical treatment, it is natural for him or 
39 Re R, above, 24. 
40 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402,409 (HL). 
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her to also consider whether to refuse it. If the child chooses not to consent then is he 
or she not refusing? The distinction made in Re R between consenting to medical 
treatment and refusing medical treatment is artificial. If a child is competent to 
consent to medical treatment then that same child must also be competent to refuse 
that exact same treatment. The child still has to consider the same factors. Some 
critics may argue that refusing treatment could have more serious consequences, 
such as death , than consenting to treatment, and that it is the implications of the 
refusal of treatment that the child may not have the capacity to decide. It must be 
remembered that under the Gillick test the child must understand the nature and 
consequences of the treatment and the implications of such refusal. 
This paper argues that if the decision in Re R is followed this would override 
the majority decision in Gillick and that separating the test (consenting and refusing 
to consent) causes an artificial distinction and creates uncertainty in the law for all 
concerned. Furthermore the argument suggested in Re R that the House of Lords in 
Gillick only decided whether children could consent to treatment is rejected. It is 
contended that when the House of Lords held a competent child could consent to 
treatment the House of Lords envisaged that this would include the ability to also 
refuse medical treatment. 
D Gillick Competence and Religion 
In the later English case of Re L ( Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency ;41 a 
14 year-old girl suffered very serious bums which resulted in a life threatening 
condition in which it was necessary to give her a blood transfusion to save her life. 
The girl refused the transfusion on the basis that she was a Jehovah's Witness . The 
child was considered mature for her age. She also had an 80 percent chance of 
survival following the surgery and blood transfusions, but without the proposed 
treatment it was inevitable that death would occur. The doctor informed her that the 
transfusion was necessary in order to save her life, however, the family decided that 
it would be too distressing for her to be told that if she did not receive the treatment 
her death would be slow and horrible. The medical evidence given was that her death 
would be grave, in that gangrene would supervene for some time and she would have 
41 Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810 (FD). 
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a very slow and painful death, which would be distressing for all concerned. The 
Court in this case had no hesitation in overriding her wishes. The Court found that 
she was not Gillick competent. The Judge held:
42 
... the girl's view as to having no blood transfusion is based on a very 
sincerely, strongly held religious belief which does not in fact lend itself 
in her mind to discussion. It is one that has been formed by her in the 
context of her own family experience and the Jehovah's Witnesses' 
meetings where they all support this view. He makes the point that there 
is a distinction between a view of this kind and the constructive 
formulation of an opinion which occurs with adult experience. This has 
not happened of course in the case of this young girl. 
She has led what has been expressed to have been a sheltered life, not an 
unrealistically sheltered life, but nevertheless a sheltered life. Her family 
circle is a tight one, in one sense, although there are a number of 
members of the family. 
Although the girl may have meant it when she expressed that she was willing 
to die rather than have the blood transfusion, the Judge, however, was of the opinion 
that she was unable to make that decision. This was based on the fact that she had not 
received all the information, namely the way in which her death would occur. " .. .it 
would be right and appropriate to have [this information] in mind when making such 
a decision."43 The Judge accordingly found that the girl was not Gillick competent 
and ordered that the operation and blood transfusion go ahead. As an obiter statement 
the Judge held that even if she was Gillick competent it would be appropriate to 
make the order as this was an extreme case and it was vital she receive the 
treatment.44 The Court did not rely on Re Ras its authority to ovenide her wishes. 
The Judge was cmTect to find that the girl was not Gillick competent. She 
could not have made a decision of life versus death without knowing all the facts, 
including the way in which her death would occur. If the family felt it was too 
distressing to tell her this information, one can only imagine how distressing it would 
have been for her in the drawn out process of dying. However, if she had been fully 
aware of the facts and found to be Gillick competent then her right to die on the basis 
42 Re L, above, 813 . 
43 Re L, above, 813. 
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of religion should be upheld. If a child is found to be Gillick competent then 
essentially the Court treats you as an adult. If an adult who is competent can refuse 
medical treatment on the basis of religion then so should a Gillick competent child. 
To override the child's wishes is to undermine his or her autonomy. 
In a more recent English case45 the Court overrode the wishes of a 15 year-
old girl who refused to consent to a heart transplant. Up until this point the girl had 
been fit and healthy. She suddenly developed a life threatening condition. The girl's 
parents consented to the operation, but she refused on the basis that she did not want 
someone else's heart and also did not want to take medication for the rest of her life. 
"Equally she did not wish to die".
46 In ordering consent for the transplant the Judge 
held that " ... M felt overwhelmed by her circumstances and the decision she was 
being asked to make. .. . Events have overtaken her so swiftly that she has not been 
able to come to terms with her situation."
47 Although the Judge never said that M 
was not Gillick competent the fact that she did not want the heart and combined with 
the fact that she did not want to die indicates that she may not have been competent 
to make the decision. It was appropriate that the Court intervened and overrode her 
uncertain wishes. It is also interesting to note that the Court did not refer to Re R, 
although the Judge noted that a refusal by a child is important but not decisive.
48 
The English courts have taken a similar approach in other cases. In Re E (a minor) 
(wardship: medical treatment/
9 a 15 year-old Jehovah's Witness who refused a 
blood transfusion was held not to be competent. Although he had some concept that 
he would die, he did not realise the full implications of the dying process. The court 
"should be very slow to allow an infant to martyr himself."
50 Johnson J adopted a 
similar approach in Re S (a minor) (consent to medical treatment;5
1 where a 15 year-
old Jehovah's Witness refused a blood transfusion. The Judge held the girl was 
confused over many details, and did not know how her death would occur. The Judge 
44 Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810, 814 (FD). 
45 Re M [1999] Fam Law 753 (FD). 
46 Re M, above, 756. 
41 Re M, above, 756. 
48 Re M, above, 754. 
49 Re E (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1993] l FLR 386. 
50 Re E, above, 386. 
5 1 Re S (a minor) (consent to medical treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065 . 
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noted that the girl did not believe that a refusal would lead to her death because there 
might be a miracle and God might save her.
52 
E Summary of the English Position 
Since the decision of Re R there has been much academic debate as to 
whether Re R has oveITuled the Gillick decision. Some academics argue that Gillick 
is only the authority stating that a competent child can consent to treatment without 
parental consent, and that Re R is the authority which allows both the parents and 
courts to override the child's refusal to medical treatment whether Gillick competent 
or not. Others have argued that the Gillick test meant once a child had reached 
maturity to make the decision and was competent to do so, then the parents lose their 
parental control over the decision. 
What is certain is that the Gillick test continues to be applied and refeITed to. 
It is interesting to note that the later cases do not appear to rely on Re R as their 
authority for overriding the child ' s wishes . The courts will normally hold the child to 
be Gillick incompetent when the issue of refusing treatment arises . As far as the 
competent child and religion are concerned, the courts do not separate out the 
religious factor in the same way that they do for competent adults . However, in the 
above religious cases all of the children were held not to be Gillick competent 
because they failed to understand the consequences of refusing medical treatment or 
because they had not been fully info1med of the consequences. Before looking at the 
New Zealand position it is necessary to review the law in other overseas 
jurisdictions. The next section in this paper will review the law in Australia, Canada 
and the United States, to see whether competent children in those countries can 
refuse to consent to medical treatment. 
IV OTHER COUNTRIES 
A Australia 
The Australian courts like New Zealand have not had to decide a case similar 
to that of Re R where the right to refuse medical treatment was in issue. The 
52 Re S, above. 
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Australian courts have, however, approved the Gillick competency test,s
3 but in that 
case the child wanted the treatment but because of the nature of the treatment it was 
necessary to apply to the Court for approval. Although the child's wishes were 
considered, the Family Court held that she was not Gillick competent to make this 
decision.s4 
The 1983 amendments to the Family Law Act 1972 gave the High Court of 
Australia welfare jurisdiction. This allows the court to act as parens patriae. This 
gives the court the power to authorise medical treatment where the child is unable to 
consent. Under this Act the guiding criteria for the court is the "welfare of the child" 
or the "best interests" principle.ss 
B Canada 
In Canada a competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, even if 
it has potentially fatal results.s6 The common law in Canada also recognises this 
right for children so long as they are "mature minors". If the child is competent then 
this allows the child to consent or refuse medical treatment. The capacity test 
involves:s7 
... the ability to understand the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a 
treatment decision in a mature and comprehensive way. The significance 
and repercussions of a decision are relevant in assessing capacity. 
Capacity is presumed at the age of sixteen. An individual may have 
sufficient maturity and judgment at a younger age. 
53 Re A 16 Fla.L.Rev 715 (FC). This case concerned a 14 year-old child whose mother had applied to 
the Court to have certain medical procedures performed on A, namely to assign male sex organs. 
When A was born she was diagnosed as a female, but had a condition which gave her a male 
appearance. As a child A had surgery to give her a female appearance, but during her childhood she 
did not receive enough hormone replacement therapy. This resulted in the recurrence of male 
features. The proposed surgery would return A to a male. Given the medical and psychological 
evidence the Court allowed the operation to proceed. 
54 Re A, above, 721. 
55 Helen Rhoades "Intellectual Disability and Sterilisation -An Inevitable Connection?" (1995) 
Australian Journal of Family Law Lexis 25, 2 . 
56 See Fleming v Reid (1991) 82 DLR (4'h) 298 (Ont. CA). 
57 Tarin Hand Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto 10 O.F.L.R. 82, 88. 
In 1996 Ontario introduced new legislation addressing the issues of medical 
consent. The 1996 Consent Act was enacted to clarify the law surrounding consent to 
medical treatment. Section 4(1) of the Act allows a "person" who is able to 
understand the proposed treatment and its consequences to make his or her own 
decision regarding treatment. Section 4(2) has a presumption that a person is able to 
make his or her own decisions in relation to medical treatment. Under sections 4(3) 
and 10(1), unless health care providers have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
patient does not understand the treatment or the possible consequences of giving or 
refusing consent, they must abide by the patient's expressed wishes. Unless there is 
reason to believe otherwise health care professionals may assume that they have 
obtained valid consent or refusal from a person. 
Under the 1996 Consent Act the term 'person' is not defined. At common 
law, in Canada, a human being after birth becomes a person when it takes its first 
breath after birth.58 The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Re Baby R
59 held that 
the definition of "person" includes children. Under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms60 the term "person" has been judicially defined as including children 
under the age of 16 years in R v J. 
61 The law in Canada has defined the term 
"persons" to include children, and therefore children are presumed to be able to 
consent to their own medical treatment under the 1996 Consent Act. Legislation in 
British Columbia gives children specific rights to direct their treatment.
62 It appears 
that the 1996 Consent Act did not change the law, as it was previously recognised 
under the common law that children could direct their own treatment. 
In Johnston v Wellesley HospitaI6
3 Addy J of the Ontario High Court of 
Justice held there is no specific age at which a minor becomes legally capable of 
making his or her own decisions regarding medical treatment. Accordingly minors 
have the right to consent or refuse medical treatment so long as they understand the 
nature and consequences of the treatment. The Ontario legislation entrenched this 
rule initially under the 1992 Consent to Treatment Act, which was repealed by the 
58 R v Sullivan [1991] l SCR 489,503 (SC). 
59 Re Baby R (1988) 15 RFL (3d) 225. 
60 Part l of the Constitution Act 1982. 
61 R v J (1982) l Canadian Rights Reported 202,204, Ontario Court of Justice (Provincial Division). 
62 Infants Act, Revised Statutes of British Columbia 1996, chapter 223, section 17. 
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current 1996 Consent Act. Under section 6(1) of the 1992 Act, a person could 
consent to medical treatment if that person understood the nature and possible 
consequences of the proposed medical treatment. Under that Act this meant that 
children could consent to medical treatment so long as they understood the nature 
and consequences. This recognised that children may be able to consent to some 
treatment and not others. This test is in line with the English Gillick competency test. 
The 1996 Consent Act expanded on many of the rights given to persons in the 
repealed 1992 Act. Section 15(1) of the 1996 Consent Act recognises that a person 
can consent to some procedures but not others, and section 15(2) acknowledges that 
a person may be able to consent to treatment at one time but not at another. These 
sections enforce the idea that as children get older they can consent to different types 
of treatment. 
Furthermore section 16 recognises that a child may develop the required 
understanding during the treatment. This section applies to children suffering from 
chronic conditions and diseases. If this happens health care providers must respect 
the wishes of the child regarding ongoing treatment over those of the parents. For 
example a 8 year old may not understand the treatment he or she is receiving, but as 
he or she gets older and understands the disease and the nature of the treatment and 
risks associated with continuing and ending it, that child has the right to make 
decisions regarding ongoing treatment. The 1992 Act did not specifically allow 
someone to make later decisions regarding treatment if someone else provided the 
initial consent. 
In Re Y A64 and in the case of Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 
Hospital Corp65 the Court upheld the children ' s right to refuse medical treatment. In 
both cases the children were 15 years old. In Walker provincial legislation applied to 
a 15 year-old child. Section 3 of the Medical Consent of Minors Act S.N.B 1976 
codifies the test for a child ' s capacity to refuse or consent to medical treatment. 
Under this section it must be the medical opinion of two doctors that the child has the 
63 Johnston v Wellesley Hospital (1971] 2 Ontario Reports 103 (HC). 
64 Re YA (1993) 111 Nfld & P.E.I.R 91 (FC). 
65 Walker (Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospital Corp (1994) 4 RFL (4°') 32 1 (CA). 
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capacity to refuse or accept treatment and the decision must be in the best interests of 
the child. 
In both the Walker and Re YA cases, the treating doctors were satisfied that 
the children had the capacity to refuse treatment. In Walker the 15 year-old 
Jehovah's Witness refused life saving treatment for his leukemia because it involved 
blood transfusions. Hoyt CJ and Angers J in finding for the boy held that he had 
sufficient maturity for his wishes to be respected.
66 Hoyt J held that where minors 
can understand the nature and consequences of the proposed treatment, interference 
with their wishes cannot be justified.
67 Ryan J concurred with the result but his 
reasoning was different. His Honour held that while a mature minor could consent to 
medical treatment, he or she cannot always refuse it. The court should use its parens 
patriae jurisdiction to override the wishes of a parent or to protect the child's life if 
that life is in danger.68 In this case the boy's condition was not life threatening and 
therefore his wishes had to be respected. Ryan J's reasoning is similar to that in Re R 
in that a competent child can consent to treatment but cannot refuse medical 
treatment. His Honour also pointed out that if the boy's condition changed he would 
consider forcing him to undergo treatment. 
C United States 
In the United States many states have statutes which allow children to 
consent to general medical and surgical care. In Alabama children of 14 years and 
older may consent to general medical care. In South Carolina the same applies 
although the age is 16 years. In Arkansas and Mississippi the law allows children 
who are sufficiently mature to understand the nature of the treatment to give consent 
to surgical and medical treatment. 69 
In Prince v Massachusetts7° the Supreme Court held that a parent's religious 
freedom is subordinate to the state's interest in preserving the health and welfare of 
the child within its borders . The Court stated "the right to practice religion freely 
66 Walker, above, 333. 
67 Walker, above, 333. 
68 Walker ( Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospital Corp ( 1994) 4 RFL ( 4th) 321, 333 (CA). 
69 Patricia Donovan "Teenagers' Right to Consent To Reproductive Health Care" 
http ://www.agi -usa.org/pubs/ib2 l.html (last accessed 18 March 2000). 
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does not include liberty to expose the child to ill health or death."
71 In Gregory Alan 
Novak v United States District Court For the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta 
Division72 the plaintiff's counsel asserted that the plaintiff had an absolute right to 
refuse medical treatment as part of his right to privacy. The plaintiff also argued that 
by denying him the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, his First Amendment 
right to freedom of religion had also been violated. In this case the plaintiff purported 
the right to refuse a blood transfusion on the basis of religion. 
The Court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that an individual's 
constitutional rights do not instantly appear upon an individual reaching the age of 
majority. Furthermore the Court agreed that minors have some level of constitutional 
protection with respect to religious freedom and have "a substantial liberty interest in 
not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment."
73 However, the Court noted 
that the plaintiff's counsel were unable to cite any reported Georgia case for the 
proposition that a 16 year-old "mature minor" has a constitutional right to refuse a 
blood transfusion pursuant to either the minor's First or Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. 
The statutory minimum age for the right of refusal to medical treatment is 18 
years in Georgia. Anyone under the age of 18 years are considered minors. The 
plaintiff pointed to various statutory exceptions in support of his argument. These 
exceptions give the power to refuse medical treatment if the minor is married, 
pregnant or has children. In these situations the minor can consent to medical 
treatment for themselves, their spouse and their children. The Court went onto note 
that the plaintiff's citation of cases holding that a competent adult has the right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment and that minors have a constitutional right to 
consent to an abortion were inappropriate.
74 The Court went so far as to say that 
these exceptions undermined the plaintiff's argument. 
10 Prince v Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158, 88 L.Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944). 
71 Prince v Massachusetts, above, 166. 
72 Gregory Alan Novak v United States District Court For the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta 
Division 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1563; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5112. 
73 The Court referred to the decision of Parham v J.R, 442 U.S . 584,600, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct. 
2493 (1979) as its authority for this proposition. 
14 Gregory Alan Novak, above, 17. 
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The Court stated "[i]f minors, "mature" or otherwise, possessed the power to 
consent to and / or refuse medical treatment, there would be no need for these 
statutory exceptions."75 The Court noted that the Supreme Court has stated that 
"most children in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments 
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical treatment."
76 "It has 
been firmly established that courts [in the United States] can order compulsory 
medical treatment of children for any serious illness or injury ... and there are no 
religious exemptions from these orders."77 The plaintiff's argument that the "mature 
minor" exception was part of the common law of Georgia was rejected by the Court. 
Furthermore it is clear that in the United States the courts will just as easily 
override the wishes of the parent. It has been said that "not even parents have an 
unbridled discretion to exercise their religious beliefs when the state's interest in 
preserving the health of children within its borders weighs in the balance."
78 
D Summary of overseas 
In summary Australia, Canada and the United States all have similar tests to 
that of the English Gillick test. However, in Canada there is one significant 
difference and that is under their 1996 Consent Act where there is the presumption 
that children are competent unless there is reason to believe otherwise. Under the 
common law in the United States and Australia, minors are presumed to be 
incompetent to make their own decisions regarding medical treatment. The only 
exceptions are where the children are manied, legally emancipated from their 
parents, or are competent to understand both the nature and the risks involved in the 
treatment. 
Although the Australian courts have not had to consider whether a competent 
child can refuse medical treatment on the grounds of religion, the Canadian courts 
have been prepared to respect the religious wishes of competent minors in 
75 Gregory Alan Novak, above 19. 
76 Parham v J.R, 442 U.S . 584, 603. 
77 Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. , 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80,331 F. 
2d 1000, 1007-8. 
78 Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L.Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944), 166-167. 
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circumstances that are not life threatening. 7
9 The American courts on the other hand 
have held religious beliefs to be subordinate to the state's interest in preserving a 
minor's life. 80 
V NEW ZEALAND'S LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND THE CHILD'S 
RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMNT 
So far this paper has analysised the English decisions of Gillick and Re R as 
to whether a competent chi Id can consent, and can refuse to consent, to medical 
treatment, and how other overseas countries treat competent children. This section 
intends to review New Zealand's legal frameworks in relation to a competent child's 
right to refuse medical treatment and proposes how the New Zealand courts should 
apply these frameworks. 
A Article 12 of the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child 
A11icle 12 requires that children have the right to express their views m 
matters which affect them, and that those views be given due weight in accordance 
with the age and maturity of the child. The United Nations Conventions on the 
Rights of the Child promote the right of children to self-determination, dignity, 
respect, non-interference, and the right to make informed decisions. The European 
cha11er for children in hospital states that "children and parents have a right to 
informed participation in all decisions involving their health care. Every child should 
be protected from unnecessary medical treatment and investigation."
81 
Many adults are uncomfortable about letting children decide medical 
treatment for themselves, in particular this would seem to be when a child wishes to 
refuse medical treatment. It has been suggested that children are ignorant, foolish and 
inexperienced to know what is in their best interests.
82 This argument goes against 
the right to self-determination. It is self-determination which is the key to all human 
79 Re YA (1993) 111 Nfld & P.E.I.R 91 (FC); Walker ( Litigation Guardian of) v Region 2 Hospital 
Corp (1994) 4 RFL (4th) 321 (CA). 
80 Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L.Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944). 
81 Priscilla Alderson "European charter of children's rights." (1993) Bulletin of Medical Ethics 13-5. 
The charter was based on the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child. 
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rights. The right to have a choice 1s the underlying essential element to right 
holders. 83 
B The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers Rights 
Right 7(2) presumes every consumer is competent to consent to treatment 
unless there are reasonable grounds to presume otherwise. Under Right 7(3) if you 
have diminished competence because you are a child you should be allowed to 
consent to medical treatment to the level of your ability. This would seem to imply 
that whether a child is competent is a matter of fact and will depend on each child's 
situation and the type of treatment he or she is consenting too. Right 7(7) provides 
that every individual has the right to refuse medical treatment. The Gillick test seems 
to be reflected in the above rights. 
C Guardianship Act 1968 
Parental rights in New Zealand are normally associated with the rights given 
to guardians. No1mally the parents will be the guardians. This comes through in 
section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1968. Guardianship means the guardian has the 
right of control over the upbringing of a child.84 The word upbringing is defined to 
include education and religion of the child. A child means anyone under the age of 
20 years. It would appear from the definition of guardian that parents have control 
over all decisions affecting the child, and that this is strengthened by the provisions 
in section 14 which provides a procedure where children over the age of 16 years can 
dispute a parental decision. In such cases the matter goes to a Family Court Judge. 
These provisions imply that Parliament has intended to restrict the decision 
making ability of children between the age of 16 and 20 years and that such children 
do not have the self-autonomy to make decisions for themselves except in provisions 
which are expressly provided in the Act. 8
5 
Section 33 provides that the Guardianship Act 1968 is to be a code, except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this Act. The code replaces the common law and 
82 Alderson, above, 13. 
83 Alderson, above, 13. 
84 Section 3 of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
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equity.86 The question then becomes to what extent does the Guardianship Act 
override the common law and are the decisions of Gillick and Re R irrelevant in New 
Zealand? It is important to note that the Act does not cover every situation. The 
courts have the scope to develop the law. This can be seen through provisions such 
as section 23 which states that the welfare of the child is the first and paramount 
consideration. These are words that allow a large scope for interpretation.
87 
Section 25(1) and (2) provide that all people 16 years and over, and all 
manied people, can give a valid consent to operations. Section 25 states: 
25 Consents to operations 
(1) Subject to subsection (6) of this section, the consent of a child of or over the 
age of 16 years to any donation of blood by him, or to any medical, surgical, or 
dental procedure (including a blood transfusion) to be carried out on him for his 
benefit by a person professionally qualified to carry it out, shall have the same effect 
as if he were of full age. 
(2) The consent of or refusal to consent by a child to any donation of blood or to 
any medical, surgical , or dental procedure (including a blood transfusion) whether to 
be carried out on him or on any other person , shall if the child is or has been married 
have the same effect as if he were of full age. 
(3) Where the consent of any other person to any medical, surgical, or dental 
procedure (including a blood transfusion) to be carried out on a child is necessary or 
sufficient, consent may be given-
(a) By a guardian of the child; or 
(b) If there is no guardian in New Zealand or no such guardian can be found with 
reasonable diligence or is capable of giving consent, by a person in New Zealand 
who has been acting in the place of a parent; or 
(c) If there is no person in New Zealand who has been so acting, or if no such 
person can be found with reasonable diligence or is capable of giving consent, by a 
[District Court Judge] or the [[chief executive]] . 
(4) Where a child has been lawfully placed for the purpose of adoption in the 
home of any person that person shall be deemed to be a guardian of the child for the 
purposes of subsection (3) of this section. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect any enactment or rule of law 
whereby in any circumstances-
(a) No consent or no express consent is necessary ; or 
(b) The consent of the child in addition to that of any other person is necessary; or 
(c) Subject to subsection (2) of this section the consent of any other person instead 
of the consent of the child is sufficient. 
(6) Except to the extent that this section enables a blood transfusion (as defined in 
subsection (l) of section 126B of the Health Act 1956) to be administered to a child 
without the consent of any other person, nothing in this section shall affect the 
provisions of the said section 126B. 
85 For example section 25 and 25A of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
86 Section 33(1 ) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
87 WR Atkin "Parents and Children Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" ( 1986) NZLJ 90, 91. 
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The question that needs to be addressed is whether section 25 would override 
the Gillick test. Under subsections (3) and (5) , consent may be given by a guardian or 
by a person who has been acting in the place of a parent. Subsection 5(a) preserves 
the common law whereby no consent or no express consent is necessary. "This 
subsection does not expressly refer to any rule whereby the consent of the child alone 
will be sufficient, but arguably a rule about the non-necessity of parental consent 
could fall within the exception (a) ."88 Subsection 5(a) does not expressly state whose 
consent need not be obtained. It could reasonably be argued that given the context of 
the section , subsection 5(a) embraces the situations identified in the Gillick case.89 It 
appears that under subsection 5(a) no parental consent is necessary because 
Parliament has expressly provided that a child can give sufficient consent. 
The co-existence of the Gillick test and section 25 can be seen in section 
25(3) where the subsection states "where the consent of any other person . . .is 
necessary or sufficient." The subsection does not describe the circumstances in 
which another person ' s consent is necessary or sufficient.90 This leaves situations in 
which the courts will be left to decide whether the child is competent to consent to 
medical treatment. 
However, section 25 does not deal specifically with a parent's right to 
override the refusal of a child, nor does this section address whether the consent of a 
minor under 16 could be effective consent. There is no evidence that Parliament 
intended this provision to mean that a child under 16 cannot consent to medical 
treatment. Although the Guardianship Act has provided that a child is competent to 
consent to medical treatment from 16 years and above, it has not stated what are the 
rights of competent children under 16. Even though guardianship includes the right 
to control over the upbringing of a child, this is not a right which is exclusive or 
allows complete control.9 1 As WR Atkin stated:92 
88 Atkin, above, 92. 
89 Atkin , above, 92. 
90 WR Atkin "Parents and Children Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" (1986) NZLJ 90, 93 . 
91 Atkin , above, 9 1. 
92 Atkin, above, 91. 
It is not a licence for unreasonable discipline, or for keeping a child out of 
the education system, or for starvation diets, if one happens to believe in 
these as part of bringing up children. 
However, notwithstanding section 25 of the Guardianship Act, section 25A 
allows any female child of whatever age to consent to an abortion. Under subsection 
(b) a child can also refuse to consent to an abortion. The child's consent or refusal to 
consent has the same effect as if she were of full age. One may wonder why 
Parliament has expressly provided a provision which recognises that a child is 
competent to consent to an abortion but not to other treatment? The lengthy first, 
second and third parliamentary readings shed no light on this. The general comments 
throughout the debates support the policy decision that people should have the right 
to choose, although others would not necessary have an abortion themselves.93 It was 
recognised that if women were not able to have abortions it would result in back 
street abortion clinics or women flying to Australia where abortions could be 
performed. 94 The issue of children was not specifically addressed. 
Section 25A, although enacted before the Gillick decision, provides that 
children can be competent in some circumstances to consent and refuse to consent to 
medical treatment which affects them. It is also interesting to note that New Zealand 
legislation provides that if a child is married or has been married he or she may 
consent or refuse to consent to medical treatment and this shall have the effect as if 
he or she was of full age. 95 
Why is it that Parliament has provided that a minor who has married, for 
parental consent is necessary, is from that moment on classed as legally competent to 
consent and competent to refuse to consent to medical treatment? But for his or her 
marriage is that child not the same child which may or may not be competent to 
consent? Does marriage suddenly make a child competent? Does this not provide an 
artificial distinction? For example, if you have two 14 year-old children who both 
require a blood transfusion, and who both refuse on the basis of religion, is it not 
artificial to say that the child who is married would legally have his or her wishes up 
93 (11 October 1977) 414 NZPD 3520, 3566. 
94 (15 December 1977) 416 NZPD 5384, 5391. 
95 Section 25(2) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
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held but the one who is not married will not? Surely we should be looking at 
whether the child involved is competent to make such a decision and not whether he 
or she is married? As Lord Scarman stated: 96 
If the Jaw should impose upon the process of 'growing up ' fixed limits 
where nature knew only a continuous process , the price would be 
artificiality and a Jack of realism in an area where the law must be 
sensitive to human development and social change. 
Further section 23(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968 provides that the welfare 
of the child is the .first and paramount consideration. Section 23 states: 
23 Welfare of child paramount 
(1) In any proceedings where any matter relating to the custody or guardianship of 
or access to a child, or the administration of any property belonging to or held in 
trust for a child , or the application of the income thereof, is in question, the Court 
shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration. The 
Court shall have regard to the conduct of any parent to the extent only that such 
conduct is relevant to the welfare of the child. 
[(lA) For the purposes of this section, and regardless of the age of a child, there 
shall be no presumption that the placing of a child in the custody of a particular 
person will, because of the sex of that person, best serve the welfare of the child.] 
(2) In any [proceedings under subsection (1) of this section] the Court shall 
ascertain the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and shall, 
subject to [section 19( 4) or section 19A(2)] of this Act, take account of them to such 
extent as the Court thinks fit, having regard to the age and maturity of the child. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall limit the provisions of [section 22C of this Act or 
of] sections 64 and 64A of the Trustee Act 1956 [or of Part l of the Guardianship 
Amendment Act 1991]. 
Although section 23(1) relates to any matter relating to the custody or 
guardianship it is argued that when the court is acting in its wardship role it is 
essentially acting in the place of the parents as the child' s guardian. Under section 
23(2) a court exercising its jurisdiction is required to ascertain the wishes of the 
child, if the child is able to express them, and shall take account of them to such 
extent as the court thinks fit , having regard to the age and maturity of the child. 
Under the wardship jurisdiction the court has the discretion as to the weight that 
should be attached to the child's wishes, but is not bound to act on them. However, 
under section 23(1) the welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration. 
96 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402, 421 (HL). 
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This implies that the child's wishes should be taken into account. Therefore in any 
proceedings involving a decision as to medical treatment, the wishes of the child 
must be considered. As Lord Scarman said the rigid parental rights at any particular 
age will not provide a solution to the problem. The solution "depended upon a 
judgment of what was best for the welfare of the particular child."97 Furthermore it is 
argued that because the court does not have to act in cases where a competent child 
has the ability to consent, it need not act on a Gillick competent child's refusal. 
The statements in the Gillick decision are consistent with the statutory 
provisions in the Guardianship Act 1968. Until Parliament makes the decision to 
intervene, the courts should apply the Gillick test in New Zealand, and as Lord 
Scarman stated "the principle should be flexible enough to enable justice to be 
achieved by its application to the particular circumstances proved by the evidence 
placed before them."98 
New Zealand has one other major legal framework, namely the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. The next section in this paper will review the relevant 
provisions of that Act and how they support a competent child's right to refuse 
medical treatment. 
D The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBOR Act) 
The core sections that are relevant to this paper are section 11, 13 and 15 
which state: 
11 Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment 
Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical 
treatment. 
13 Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold 
opinions without interference. 
15 Manifestation of religion and belief 
Every person has the right to manifest that person ' s religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either 
97 Gillick, above, 420. 
98 Gillick, above, 42 1. 
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individually or in community with others, and either in public or 
in private. 
The question that arises is: what is the ambit of the rights contained in the 
above provisions? It is submitted that section 11 was intended to have a wide ambit, 
given the use of the words "any medical treatment". This implies that it was 
Parliament's intention not to limit the scope of this right. In the White Paper report to 
Parliament on the Bill of Rights,99 it was noted that this provision is unique to New 
Zealand and that there has been no equivalent provision in the International 
Covenant, nor in any other international human rights provisions.
100 The report 
envisaged that the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment would permit 
individuals to be treated against their wi]] only where it is necessary to protect the 
health and safety of other persons and not in cases where a refusal will detrimentally 
affect their own health. 101 The rep01t then goes on to state that under the current law 
children are incapable of consenting on their own behalf, and that parents, guardians 
and certain other persons may consent and override their wishes. The report notes 
that there are exceptions, namely section 25, and 25A of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
The report, however, did not specifica]]y state that this right does not apply to 
competent children and the comts have since held that 'everyone' means everyone 
h · 102 w o 1s competent. 
The ambit of sections 13 and 15 is not so clear. What is the definition of the 
key terms in sections 13 and 15? What does freedom of thought, conscience, religion 
and belief mean? How wide are the rights and what type of situations did Parliament 
envisage would fall within these rights? It is submitted that a competent child's right 
to refuse blood products on the basis of his or her religious beliefs would come 
within the ambit as a right to hold his or her opinion without the state interference. 
Jehovah's Witnesses, hold the belief that individuals should not receive blood 
products. This belief forms part of their religious practice. The freedom to choose 
and practise a religious belief is fundamental to an individual's autonomy to conduct 
99 New Zealand Government White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Government Print, 
Wellington, 1985). 
100 New Zealand Government White Paper, above, A.6. 
101 New Zealand Government White Paper, above, A.6. 
102 Re S [1992) l NZLR 363,374 (HC). 
his or her life without interference from the state. 103 Surely, a competent child's 
refusal on the basis of religious beliefs would come within the right to manifest his or 
her religious practice. 
The White Paper report does not elaborate on the extent of these rights, 
although it notes that these rights might have to be tested against the limitations in 
section 5 of the NZBOR Act. 104 The difficulty with the NZBOR Act arises in the 
following sections. Section 6 of the NZBOR Act 1990 provides that: 
6 Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
preferred to any other meaning. 
And sections 4 and 5 provide: 
4 Other enactments not affected 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made 
before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or 
revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this 
Bill of Rights. 
5 Justified limitations 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Since the enactment of the NZBOR Act there has been much debate 
surrounding the analysis of the above provisions.
105 The courts will have to look at 
the NZBOR Act when considering the best interests of the child under the 
Guardianship Act 1968. If the New Zealand comts override the wishes of competent 
103 Grant Huscroft, Paul Rishworth Rights and Freedoms (Brookers , Wellington, 1995) 226. 
104 New Zealand Government White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Government Print, 
Wellington, 1985) A.6. 
105 FM Brookfield, "Constitutional Law"(l992) NZ Recent Law Review 231,237; Andrew Bulter, 
"Judicial Indications oflnconsistency - A New Weapon in the Bill of Rights Armoury?" (2000) 
NZLR43. 
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children, the courts, in terms of section 5, must constitute only such reasonable 
limitation on freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and the right to refuse 
medical as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
106 If the 
courts consider that the rights have been made subject to an unreasonable limitation, 
which cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, there arises 
a breach of section 5 of the NZBOR Act 1990.107
 Because section 5 is subject to 
section 4, that breach does not invalidate the court ' s wardship jurisdiction to override 
the child's or the parent's wishes. 
The relevant provisions of the NZBOR Act 1990 must be given full weight. 
Section 6 of the NZBOR Act requires that where an enactment can be given a 
meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBOR 
Act, that meaning shall be preferred to any other. If there are two meanings , the one 
which is most in harmony with the NZBOR Act must be embraced. 
108 As noted by 
Tipping J, section 5, when read with section 6, fu]fills a similar role. If an enactment 
limits the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBOR Act the enactment should be 
given such tenable meaning and application as constitutes the least possible 
limitation. 109 
In most cases some limits will need to be placed on rights contained in the 
NZBOR Act, but the combined effect of sections 4 and 5 results in a need to 
emphasise the words "promotes or supports" a meaning which impinges as little as 
possible on the rights. Looking at the long title of the NZBOR Act it indicates that a 
commitment to individual constitutional rights is not only required by international 
Jaw, but that that commitment must develop. "Affirm", "protect" and "promote" are 
all words used which suggest activity.
11 0 The Act should be interpreted to support a 
competent child who appreciates the significance of the treatment, and chooses to 
refuse it. The treatment should not be imposed on the child. 
106 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16 (CA). 
101 Moonen, above, 16. 
108 Moonen, above, 16. 
109 Moonen, above, 16. 
11 0 Re S [1992] l NZLR 363 ,374 (HC). 
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The Court of Appeal has held that the NZBOR Act requires a "generous 
interpretation suitable to give individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms referred to." 111 A purposive approach should be taken when 
determining the extent of the rights. Cooke P has stated "[i]n previous Bill of Rights 
cases I have tried to emphasise the importance of a straightforward and generous 
approach to the provisions of the Act." 11 2 It would seem that the rights have been 
defined widely and if an individual's right has been prima facie breached, then it will 
be necessary for the court to look at section 5 to see whether there should be a 
justified limitation. 
If the New Zealand courts were to override a competent child' s right to refuse 
medical treatment, on the basis of religious grounds , it is submitted, this would be a 
violation of the rights contained in sections 11 , 13 and 15 of the NZBOR Act 1990. 
Although the New Zealand courts have not been faced with this issue, it is argued 
that a child who is competent should be treated no differently from that of an adult, 
and that this situation should come within the ambit of the above rights. A competent 
adult in New Zealand has the 1ight to refuse medical treatment and practice his or her 
religion. There is nothing in the NZBOR Act which suggests that the Act does not 
apply to competent children . 
The other remaining question under the NZBOR Act 1990 is whether the 
comts should override the refusal of parental consent to medical treatment of their 
children, particularly in cases involving religious grounds. It is apparent that the 
courts are willing to hold, in cases where the child is too young to express his or her 
wishes, that a child' s ri ght to life under section 8 of the NZBOR Act overrides 
parental rights to religious freedom.
11 3 The right to life, regardless of the parental 
wishes, will be overridden when a child ' s life or well-being is in serious jeopardy 
and there is no other reasonable medical treatment available.
11 4 
111 Ministry of Transport v Noor! [1992] 3 NZLR 260,268 (CA). 
11 2 Simpson v Attorney-General (1994) l HRNZ 42, 57 (CA). 
113 Healthcare Otago Ltd v Will iams-Holloway (1 999] NZFLR 805 (FC); Re Norma (1992] NZFLR 
445 (HC) ; MJB v D-GSW (1996] NZFLR 337 (CA). 
11 4 Healthcare Otago Ltd v Williams-Holloway, above; Re Norma , above; MJ B v D-GSW, above. 
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Should there be a distinction between parents' rights and the child's rights in 
cases involving medical treatment? This paper asserts that yes there should. Section 
25(3)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1968 allows a parent or guardian to consent to 
treatment of their child. However, in cases where the parent refuses to consent to life 
saving treatment then section 8 of the NZBOR Act should override the parents ' 
refusal. It is argued that the rights under the NZBOR Act belong to the individual, in 
this case the competent child not the parents. The fundamental right to life or right to 
refuse medical treatment belongs to the child. If the child is unable to consent 
because he or she is incompetent, meaning too young to understand the nature of the 
decision, then the courts should do everything to maintain the child's life, even if this 
means overriding the parents wishes. 
In cases involving religion the parents normally argue that section 13 of the 
NZBOR Act applies, (the right to freedom of religion) and section 15, (the right to 
practice one's religion) but it is argued that those rights do not belong to them as 
parents. The rights should not be enforced on the child or another individual. In such 
cases the court has a duty when acting in its wardship jurisdiction to sustain the 
child ' s life. The parents' religious beliefs are their beliefs. However, once a child is 
found to be Gillick competent then those religious beliefs or rights belong to him or 
her. At this point he or she should be treated no differently from any other competent 
adult. It is submitted that the State has a duty to protect children until such time as 
they are able to make the decision for themselves. 
E Summary of New Zealand's Legal Frameworks 
It is asserted that regardless of the decision in Re R, section 6 of the NZBOR 
Act directs the New Zealand courts to interpret section 25 of the Guardianship Act 
1968 consistently with section 11 of the NZBOR Act. However, rights under the 
NZBOR Act are subject to the justified limitation clause under section 5, thus unless 
departure from the right amounted to a justified limitation, section 25 of the 
Guardianship 1968 should be read as consistent with section 11 of the NZBOR Act. 
It is submitted that there could only be a justified limitation if the child does not fully 
37 
understand the implications of his or her decision. It must be remembered that it is 
the child who has to live with the outcome of the medical treatment.
115 
Furthermore the Gillick test is reflected in Right 7(2) of the Code of Health 
and Disability Services Consumers Rights, which presumes that every consumer is 
competent to consent to medical treatment unless there are reasonable grounds. If 
you have a diminished competence because you are a child, under Right 7(3) you 
should be allowed to consent to the level of your ability. Every individual also has 
the right to refuse services under Right 7(7). Article 12 of the UN Conventions on 
the Rights of the Child' 16 requires that children have the right to express their views 
in matters which affect them, and that those views be given due weight in accordance 
with the age and maturity of the child. 
VI PARENTS' WISHES AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT 
A Can the New Zealand courts override the wishes of the parents? 
In New Zealand, and as the oversea cases demonstrate, the court under its 
wardship jurisdiction can override the wishes of the parents. Wardship has been used 
for a number of reasons. One example has been to permit blood transfusions when 
refusal is based on religious grounds. 
117 Another example has been to authorise 
cancer treatment over the preference for traditional Samoan medicine.
118 In that case 
the Court held, "[the] welfare must be dominated by one aspect, namely the chance 
f . h l'f "
119 
o savmg er 1 e. 
Although in these cases the children were too young to express their wishes, 
the cases demonstrate how the court can and will ovenide the parents wishes. When 
parents make decisions for their children, the benefit must be the benefit of the child 
115 J pH Shield, JD Baum "Children's consent to treatment." (1994) British Medical Journal 1182, 
1183. 
116 Ratified in New Zealand in 1993 . 
117 Re CL [1994] NZFLR 352 (HC). Four-year-old Jehovah's Witness child. 
118 Di rector-General of Social Welfare v M ( 1991) 8 FRNZ 498 (HC). Also see Healthcare Otago Ltd 
v Williams-Holloway [1999] NZFLR 804 (FC). 
119 Director-General of Social Welfare v M above 505. 
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and not a benefit for the parents.12
0 This argument reflects the decisions in religious 
cases, where the court's first interest is to preserve the life of the child, and not the 
wishes or beliefs of the parents. This is also reflected in the NZBOR Act 1990 where 
it can be argued that the rights belong to the child and not the parents. This paper 
supp01ts the decisions to override the parents ' wishes on the basis that the rights 
belong to the chi Id and not the parents. The state has a duty to maintain the life of the 
child until such time as the child is competent to make medical decisions for him or 
her self. Parental rights are not absolute . 
It is, however, recognised that the majority of medical decisions involving 
children under 16 years are normally carried out only with the parental approval.
121 
There are other statutory provisions which empower officials to act without parental 
consent. Under section 125 of the Health Act 1956, official medical officers can 
enter public schools (private schools if the school has requested) and child centres to 
examine the children. Parental consent is not necessary, but parents may be notified 
of any condition that the child is suffering from . 
Mrs Gillick argued that the hospital memorandum adversely affected her 
rights and duties as a parent. She argued that she had an absolute right to be informed 
of any advice and treatment given to her daughters while they were under 16 years . 
This of course would be subject to unusual situations where there was a comt order 
or abandonment of parents' duties . Lord Fraser, in reviewing parental rights, stated 
that " . . . parental rights to control a child do not exist for the benefit of the parent."
122 
Lord Fraser went on to reject the historical argument that a father had almost an 
absolute authority over his children until the age of 21. His Lordship referred to the 
historical case of Agar-Ellis v Lascelles
123 where such authority was accepted. His 
Lordship noted how the case had been criticised and in his opinion with good 
reason. 124 Lord Denning had this to say about the decision: 
125 
120 WR Atkin "Parents and Children Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" (1986) NZLJ 90, 92. 
12 1 Atkin, above, 92. 
122 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER, 402,410 (HL). 
123 Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch D 317. 
124 Gillick above, 411. 
125 Hewer v Bryant [1969] 3 ALL ER 578, 582 (CA). 
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I would get rid of the rule in Re Agar-Ellis and of the suggested 
exceptions to it. That case was decided in the year 1883. It reflects the 
attitude of a Victorian parent towards his children. He expected 
unquestioning obedience to his commands .... The common law can, and 
should, keep pace with the times. 
Lord Scarman, having considered the past generations' decisions in order to 
identify the principles underlying parental rights, found plenty of indications as to the 
governing law regarding parental rights and the child's right to make his or her own 
decisions. 126 His Lordship acknowledged that parental rights do exist and that they 
do not completely disappear until the child attains the age of majority. Parental 
rights, his Lordship noted, related to both the child and the child's property. 
However, the common law "never treated such rights as sovereign or beyond review 
and control. Nor has the law ever treated the child as other than a person with 
capacities and rights recognised by law." 127 The parental duty continues to exist so 
long as the child is in need of protection and or the property of the child. However, 
this principle is subject to certain statutory provisions where certain age limits have 
been set by Parliament. The courts have also " ... declared an age discretion at which 
a child acquires before the age of majority the tight to make his (or her) own 
decision. But these limitations in no way undermine the principle of the law, and 
should not be allowed to obscure it." 128 
Lord Scarman proceeded to compare the parental rights with the equivalent 
provision to section 23(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968. When a court has to address 
the issue of the care and upbringing of a child the court is bound by the provisions in 
the Guardianship Act and must treat the welfare of the child as the first and 
paramount consideration. His Lordship noted that this principle governs the "exercise 
of parental rights of custody, care and control." 129 This principle recognises the 
parent as a natural guardian but the parental right must be exercised in accordance 
with the welfare principle. This means the parents' wishes can be challenged, or 
overridden. 130 
126 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402,420 (HL). 
127 Gillick, above, 420. 
128 Gillick, above, 420. 
129 Gillick, above, 420. 
130 Gillick [1985] 3 ALL ER 402,420 (HL). 
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The underlying principle behind the parental right to control medical 
decisions of their children is based on the parental right or power of control of the 
person and property of his or her child. This right exists primarily so that the parent 
can discharge his or her duty of maintenance, protection and education until such 
time as the child reaches an age where he or she can decide the decisions alone. 
Although New Zealand has a statutory provision 131 which has declared a child's right 
to consent to medical treatment from the age of 16 years onwards, there is however 
no statute which has outlined the extent and duration of parental rights in respect of 
their children under the age of 16. 
In summary parental rights are not absolute. It is submitted that any decision 
involving the treatment of children the decision must be for the benefit of the child 
and not for the benefit of the parents. In cases where the child is too young to express 
his or her wishes and the parents refuse to consent to medical treatment on the basis 
of religion, the courts should protect the child and override the parents ' wishes where 
the refusal places the child in a life-threatening situation. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Gillick competent child should have the right to refuse to consent to 
medical treatment and his or her wishes should be upheld under section 11 of the 
NZBOR Act. A child' s right to refuse medical treatment should only be limited when 
a minor lacks the understanding of the decision. For example, where the child' s 
views have clearly been influenced by the views of the parents or in cases where the 
minor is suffering from a psychiatric condition which effects his or her capacity to 
understand the nature of the decision. Applying the Gillick test to section 11 of the 
NZBOR Act, the child's individual autonomy and self-determination is recognised. 
In addition the presumption of competence under the Code of Health and Disability 
Consumers Rights , and the UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child indicate that 
in cases like that of Tovia Laufau, if the child is Gillick competent, he or she should 
have the right to refuse medical treatment. If the New Zealand courts are faced with 
this decision in the future , it is submitted that the test in Gillick should be followed 
131 Guardianship Act 1968, s25 . 
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and Re R should be rejected, as it has unduly restricted the Gillick test and 
undermines the autonomy of the competent child. The statutory provisions in the 
Guardianship Act 132 have not overridden the House of Lords decision in Gillick. The 
Gillick decision would allow the New Zealand courts to permit a competent child 
under the age of 16 years the right to refuse to consent to medical treatment. 
The courts can and should override the wishes of parents. The courts have a duty to 
protect the child particularly in cases involving life-threatening conditions. It must be 
remembered that the rights belong to the child and until the child is competent to 
make the decision to refuse treatment for him or herself the courts should do 
everything possible to sustain that child' s life. 
132 Section 25. 
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